Yukie OSA
President, Association for Aid and Relief(AAR),Japan
Professor, Rikkyo University
This paper
discusses some aspects of
human security in a developed country focusing on Japan’s triple disaster on 11 March 2011. The paper first discusses what the 3/11 triple disaster revealed in terms of human
security, which had not been visible previously. It then discusses the concept of human security as preventive measures to
avoid marginalizing people and to prevent further nuclear crises, taking the example of nuclear power plant workers. The challenges facing society in Japan, which is an important part of human security, is also discussed focusing on emergency NGOs.
1. Human security vs. national security or national interest
“Was Japan such a horrible country”, asked Mr. Kenichi Hasegawa, a cattle farmer from Iitate Village in Fukushima prefecture[1] , where
radiation levels have been extremely high, despite being located outside the 30 kilometre (19 miles) exclusion
zone around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. It was not until 22
April 2011, that the
Japanese government asked the approximately 6,000 residents of Iitate to leave the village due to
radiation, even though the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) stated that its operational criteria for
evacuation were exceeded in the village as early as 30 March[2].On 22
April, 40 days after the disaster, Iitate Village was declared a Mandatory Evacuation Area, where the cumulative dose might reach 20mSv within a one- year period after the accident. Residents were
requested to evacuate in a planned manner, within approximately one month. Based the experience of Chernobyl, it is a well-known fact among researchers and experts that in radiological
emergencies, radiation levels vary significantly depending on geography and wind direction. Therefore, in order to predict levels, the System for Prediction of Environment Emergency
Dose Information (SPEEDI) was developed in Japan to provide guidance for safer evacuations.
However,
Prime Minister Kan and his cabinet did not use this system; more precisely,
they did not know of the existence of
the system and data in the early stages.
They first ordered residents to leave the area, assuming that radiation contamination spreads concentrically. As a result, some residents from the
20-kilometre “Danger Zone”
evacuated to the northwest
where actual radiation levels were much higher than where they used to live within 20 kilometres.
These people who
were exposed to extraordinarily high radiation levels have been called “Kimin”[3], meaning the “abandoned people”.
Explanations and excuses came from the very top, including Prime
Minister Kan’s Cabinet, and were made to local staff and policemen measuring radiation levels on site. Radiation data was withheld from the public for fear that its release would cause
a panic; organizations were prohibited from releasing government data. After Chernobyl, there was harsh confrontation between the military
that wanted to relocate residents living in a wider area and those who opposed
the idea due to the cost required.
The same standoff may have happened in Fukushima: perhaps the range of the radiation exclusion zone was decided so as to reduce the compensation cost, said Ryuichi Hirokawa, a photo-journalist
who has reported Chernobyl over 24 years.[4] Thus, national or economic interests may trump people’s security, or “human security”.
Theoretically, the UNDP proposed that human security was a universal concept covering people in developing, war-torn countries as well as people in developed, industrialized countries. However, in practice, human security has targeted developing countries on the assumption
that human security in highly developed, democratic countries is secured. However, 3/11 clearly showed that the concept of human security is also relevant in developed countries, where national security or
logic may take priority over human security. There is thus a need to protect human security in both developed and
developing countries.
[1] Statement by Mr.
Kenichi Hasegawa at the symposium of Shinsaigo wo Kataru tsudoi organized by
Rikkyo University on 11 October 2011.
[4] Asahi Shimbun, 7
February 2012, “NEWS KENGAI” .
2. Outline of the 3/11 disaster
At 14:46 on
11 March 2011, one of the world’s largest earthquakes, magnitude 9.0, with its
epicentre off the Sanriku coast of Miyagi Prefecture, struck a vast region of East Japan. The earthquake was caused by
the interlocking movements of three large plates, and affected an area 500
kilometres long and 200 kilometres wide along the coast, from Iwate in the
north to Ibaraki in the south. The ensuing tsunami far exceeded predictions
both in its height and destructive power. One year later, on 11 March 2012, the
National Police Agency reported that the direct death toll was 15,854, in
addition to 3,155 missing persons. According to the Reconstruction Agency, as
of March 2012, a further 1,618 persons had died from cold, stress or ill health
as a result of prolonged living in evacuation centres or injuries from which
they never recovered. Thus, the total number of dead and missing persons from
the 3/11 disaster exceeds 20,000.
Furthermore,
countless people lost their homes and jobs, and some 470,000 people were living
in temporary shelters three days after the disaster. According to the
Reconstruction Agency, as of 23
February 2012 there were 343,935 evacuees throughout the country, including
52,000 in temporary homes. Approximately 130,000 buildings were totally destroyed and 230,000
partly destroyed. At least 650,000 buildings suffered damage, and the volume of
debris reached 23 million tons.
It was not
the massive earthquake
that took the lives of so many, but the ensuing tsunami. Following the earthquake, the tsunami
travelled toward the coast as fast as a Shinkansen bullet train at the water
depth of 1,000 metres and as fast as a jet plane at the depth of 4,000 metres.
When it struck land, the tsunami surged as high as 39.7 metres in the Tarou region of Miyako City in Iwate
Prefecture and 40.0 metres in Ofunato City in Iwate
Prefecture, exceeding even the 38.2 metres height recorded in Ofunato City during the Meiji
Sanriku Earthquake of 1896.
According to NASA, the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
the movement of the huge Pacific Plate caused a change in the earth’s
distribution of mass, speeding up the earth’s rotation and shortening the
length of a day by 1.8 microseconds.
Japan’s history of great earthquakes and tsunami
The triple disaster of March 11 is considered to be a
once-in-a-thousand-year event since the Jogan Earthquake that struck the
province of Mutsu (an old name for the region) in 869.
The Jogan Earthquake, estimated to have been magnitude 8.3 to 8.6, caused
huge damage and continued to shake the Japanese archipelago and shift the land
southward to the Kanto region and Western Japan. Nine years later in 878, the
Sagami-Musashi Earthquake (M7.4) struck the Kanto region and 18 years later in
887, the Ninna Earthquake (M8.0–8.3) devastated the Tokai and Tonankai regions.
These successive earthquakes led to the collapse of the autocratic Ritsuryo
state modelled after the Tang Chinese legal system.
Japanese history shows that such disasters have frequently hit Japan. The
Keicho Earthquake (M7.9–8.0) that struck the Tokai, Nankai and Tonankai regions
in 1605 was followed only six years later by the Keicho Sanriku Earthquake in
East Japan in 1611. Just four years later the Edo Earthquake shook present-day
Tokyo. During the Meiji Era, the Meiji-Tokyo Earthquake (M7) hit the capital in 1894, the year that saw the
start of the Sino-Japanese War. Two years later, the Meiji-Sanriku Earthquake
(M8.2–8.5) struck the Tohoku region.
These interlocking movements continued well into the Taisho and Showa Eras.
The Great Kanto Earthquake (M7.9) struck in 1923, and the Showa Sanriku
Earthquake (M8.2–8.5) hit East Japan in 1933, ten years later. Then in the mid
1940s, when Japan was in a dire state as the Pacific War drew to a close, the
country was hit by the Tottori Earthquake (M7.2) in 1943, Showa Tonankai
Earthquake (M7.9) in 1944, Mikawa Earthquake (M6.8) in January 1945, the year
that the war ended, and the Showa Nankai Earthquake (M8.0) in 1946. These four
great earthquakes in four consecutive years took the lives of more than a
thousand people each. Most of these earthquakes triggered great tsunami, as was
the case of the 3/11 triple disaster in East Japan. A study is now under way to
elucidate the layers and distribution of stone and sand sediments of the
tsunami.
Most Japanese learn at middle school about the history of the country, how
people lived, the policies adopted by the court, the Shogunate and the Meiji
government. Such human-centered history focuses on social, political and
cultural development of the country. But Japan’s history is also marked by
large-scale natural disasters that led to major political changes and even the
collapse of governments.
In
contrast, the 3/11 disaster that struck East Japan was decidedly different from
other natural disasters over the millennia due to the presence of nuclear power
plants that did not exist during the great earthquakes and tsunami of the past.
Explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants owned by Tokyo Electric Power
Company (TEPCO) are located in Okuma Town (Units 1 to 4) and Futaba Town (Units
5 and 6) in Futaba County of Fukushima Prefecture. Although Fukushima
Prefecture is located in the business region of Tohoku Electric Power Company,
the electricity generated at these plants is supplied to Tokyo and the surrounding
Kanto region.
When the magnitude 9 earthquake struck, the control rods were inserted at
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants to terminate the nuclear fission
reaction of fuel rods in Units 1 to 3 that were then operating, bringing the
nuclear reactors to an automatic stop at 14:46. Almost one hour later, around
15:40, a tsunami rising to fifteen metres in height struck Units 1, 2, 3 and 4
which stand only 10 metres above sea level. (Units 5 and 6 are 13 metres above
sea level.) Even after the suspension of operation, a nuclear reactor must
continue to be cooled because the nuclear fuel rods remain very hot. However,
the earthquake and tsunami destroyed power transmission towers and prevented
emergency diesel generators from working, and without power, operation of the
three nuclear power plants could not be controlled. (Units 5 and 6 were able to
share power from an emergency diesel generator.) As a consequence, at 15:36 on
12 March, a hydrogen explosion occurred at the nuclear reactor containment building
of Unit 1 followed by another hydrogen explosion at the containment building of
Unit 3 at 11:01 on 14 March. At about 6:00 am on the 15th, there was
another hydrogen explosion, near the suppression chamber of the containment
vessel of Unit 2. At about the same time, there was an explosion, thought to
have been a hydrogen explosion, resulting in a fire at Unit 4, which was out of
operation for a routine inspection. The situation became the most critical in
the history of nuclear power following the accident at Chernobyl. With
continuous explosions and venting of air to reduce the pressure in containment
vessels, enormous volumes of radioactive materials were released from 12 March,
peaking on 15 March. According to a calculation by the Nuclear and Industrial
Safety Agency, as much as 770,000 tera Becquerels of radioactive matter was
released (tera means 1 trillion), causing serious effects in 13 prefectures[1]. In
addition, large quantities of contaminated cooling water, both high and low
concentration, were released into the sea.
As a result, 80,000 residents in Fukushima Prefecture, including 6,200 from
Iitate Village, 1,600 from Katsurao Village, 21,400 from Namie Town, 7,100 from
Futaba Town, 11,500 from Okuma Town, 15,800 from Tomioka Town, 8,000 from
Naraha Town, 5,400 from Hirono Town and 3,000 from Kawauchi Village with their
respective municipal offices had to be evacuated. They were forced to abandon
their homes, schools, land, rice paddies, farmland, cattle, temples and
ancestral graves, and could not continue to search for missing family members
and friends. Furthermore, the three municipalities of Tamura City with a
population of about 41,700, Minami Soma City with 70,000 and Kawamata Town with
15,500 were designated as partial-warning areas and planned evacuation areas,
and some 380, 14,200 and 1,000 residents respectively from these three
municipalities were evacuated. A total of 95,580 residents in 12
municipalities, including the nine mentioned above, were ordered by the
government to evacuate; these people are called “designated evacuees”. In
addition, 113 households in 104 areas of Ryozen Town and Tsukidate Town in Date
City administrative district, located to the north of Iitate Village, were also
forced to evacuate.
Including designated evacuees by government order and those who left
voluntarily, the total number of persons who sought refuge outside Fukushima
Prefecture reached 61,137 as of 30 November 2011, accounting for approximately
3% of Fukushima’s population of 2 million before the disaster.
Large numbers of residents were forced to leave their homes with their
self-governing bodies and assemblies, continuing to drift from initial
evacuation centres to second, third and even fourth evacuation centres without
receiving information on radiation, and living under unprecedented
circumstances compared even to other refugees around the world.
Mary Kaldor argues that the indicator that comes closest to a measure of
human security is displaced persons. Displaced persons are a typical feature of
contemporary crises, both natural disasters and wars.[2] As
Kaldor points out, the challenge of internally displaced persons in Fukushima
following the 3/11 disaster reflects the massive scale and complexity of the
difficulties concerning human security.
[2] Mary Kaldor, Human Security, Reflections on Globalization
and Intervention, Polity Press, 2007, p. 183.
3. Lessons of the Great East Japan Earthquake: the vulnerable become
victims
Large-scale natural disasters tend to highlight or trigger potential
structural challenges faced by social systems. The Great East Japan Earthquake
shed light on structural issues that had remained invisible since modernization
began in the Meiji Era.
As it
is not possible to cover all the issues, I will discuss those I have
experienced in supporting the victims.
Japan’s demographic structure and high mortality rates among the elderly
The 3/11 disaster was unprecedented in scale, and also in the age
composition of the victims.
Japan’s population stood at 128.06 million as of 1 October 2010, with 29.58
million (23.1%) aged over 65, the highest ever and up from 29.01 million
(22.7%) the previous year.
Japan has the highest ratio of elderly people in the world. According to
WHO statistics published in 2011, Japan had the world’s highest proportion of
people older than 60 in 2009, accounting for 30% of the population. This was
four points higher compared to Germany, Italy and San Marino that came in
second. The ratio of elderly victims in countries hit by major earthquakes,
hurricanes, tsunami or cyclones in the last ten years is the highest in Japan;
the USA ranks thirty-eighth with 18%, Sri Lanka sixtieth with 12%, Somalia 170th
with 4%, Thailand sixty-fifth with 11%, China sixtieth with 12%, Turkey
seventy-seventh with 9%, Haiti 118th with 6%, Pakistan 118th
with 6%, Bangladesh 118th with 6%, the Philippines 101st
with 7% and Myanmar ninety-first with 8%.
The 3/11 disaster hit the elderly the hardest in history.
Turning to Japan’s domestic statistical data, according to the Annual
Report on the Aging Society published in 2011 with numbers drawn from the year
2009, those aged 65 years or older accounted for 22.7% of the population.
Compared with this national average, Shimane Prefecture had the highest ratio
with 29%, Okinawa was forty-seventh with 17.5%, and the three East Japan
Prefectures where the disaster struck were as follows: Iwate Prefecture sixth
with 26.8%, Fukushima Prefecture twenty-third with 24.7% and Miyagi Prefecture
thirty-sixth with 22.1%.
As of the end of February 2012, of the 15,786 persons confirmed dead due to
the disaster, 10,064 were over 60 years of age (63.75%). By prefecture, in
Iwate there were 4,671 dead of which 3,064 (65.6%) were elderly (60 years or
older), in Miyagi there were 9,510 dead of which 5,921 (62.26%) were elderly,
and in Fukushima there were 1,605 dead of which 1,079 (67.23%) were elderly.
The proportion of people aged 65 years or older in Iwate was 26.8%, Miyagi
22.1% and Fukushima 24.7% as noted earlier, showing that in all three
prefectures the proportion of elderly victims was more than double the
proportion of the elderly in the total population. In the coastal areas of the
Sanriku region there are mainly fishing villages and small hamlets where
depopulation and ageing are progressing. Many of the elderly were engulfed by
the tsunami as they tried to escape or failed to get away as they had no one to
help them.
In
comparison, among young people aged 0 to 19 in the three prefectures in total,
885 (5.61%) died. Miyagi had the most with 619 (6.51%), followed by Iwate with
166 (3.55%) and Fukushima with 100 (6.23%). As of 1 March 2011, 0–19 year-olds
accounted for 17.89% of the total population, thus revealing that in terms of
demographic structure, relatively few children and teenagers were victims. This
may have partly been because the earthquake struck on a weekday (Friday) and at
14:46 while students were still in school and teachers could help lead them to
the safety of rooftops or higher ground. The fact that the death toll in Iwate
was low is considered to be due to its experience of tsunami in the Sanriku
region both in the Meiji and Showa Eras and the teaching of disaster prevention
in schools. In addition, the saw-tooth coastline of the area enabled students
to quickly retreat to higher ground behind schools.
High mortality rates among the persons with disabilities
Like the elderly, those with disabilities suffered high mortality rates. It
became evident from Mainichi Shimbun[1] and NHK
(Japan Broadcasting Corporation)[2] reports
that in the coastal municipalities of the three prefectures where damage was
greatest, the death rate among those with physical, intellectual or mental
disabilities was more than twice that among residents as a whole.
The Mainichi Shimbun conducted a survey in October 2011 in the 35
municipalities with the greatest number of victims along the coast of the three
affected prefectures. Thirty-three municipalities responded (Miyagi 14, Iwate 9
and Fukushima 10), while Sendai City and Rikuzentakata City did not know the
number of persons with disabilities among the dead.
At the time of the survey, the total number of the dead in the 33
municipalities was 13,619, accounting for 0.9% of the total population, but
among those certified as having physical, intellectual or mental disabilities
(76,568 persons), the number of victims was 1,568, or about 2%.
The death rate among persons with disabilities was particularly high in the
coastal areas of Miyagi. In Ishinomaki City, 599 certified disabled persons
died, accounting for 7.47% of disabled persons, compared to a death rate of
1.96% of the total population. In
Onagawa Town where 7.01% of its residents died, the death rate for persons with
disabilities was almost double at 13.88%. In particular, the death rate among
those with hearing disabilities who could not hear the warnings to evacuate was
22.5%, compared with 18.45% among those who could not move due to physical
disabilities. Similar tendencies were found in Minami Sanriku Town where 3.82%
of the residents died, whereas the death rate was 8.24% among persons with
disabilities, 14.29% among the visually disabled, 9.46% among the hearing
disabled, and 11.17% among the physically disabled (from NHK Welfare Network
news documentaries).
In
evacuation centres, persons with disabilities endured terrible situations, as
was frequently reported in the media. The fact that so many persons with
disabilities died reflects the appalling circumstances in which they were
placed. Natural disasters strike all equally, but the Great East Japan
Earthquake showed that the socially vulnerable, the elderly and persons with
disabilities suffer the most; this is the same in developed countries such as
Japan and in developing countries.
[1] The Mainichi Shimbun, 24 December 2011, “Great East Japan Earthquake, the death
rate among persons with disabilities twice”
[2] Japanese Society for
Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities (JSRPD), “Welfare of the
Persons with Disabilities ‘Normalization’”,
Nov.2011(vol.31, No.364)
Women’s burden
The Great East Japan Earthquake highlighted the issue of gender and
disasters.
There are many, including the elderly, children and persons with
disabilities and chronic diseases who need constant attention and treatment and
who thus need special care after a major disaster. However, in Japan, it has
been debatable whether women, who account for over half the population, are
categorized as vulnerable and require special support. This is generally considered to be an issue
only in developing countries and the Islamic world, but not in Japan which at
least legally recognizes women’s rights.
After the disaster victims survived the life-threatening period during
which they suffered from cold, lack of food and fuel immediately following the
earthquake, and as relief goods began to reach them and as support programmes
started to be set up in evacuation centres, gender related issues began to surface.
Men led most of the evacuation centres and voluntarily managed daily life.
There were things that needed to be improved for women, but they were
discouraged from speaking up. There were even reports of outsiders speaking up
on behalf of distraught women, but being told not to disturb the situation.
Even when sanitary napkins and other items such as women’s underwear were
delivered to municipal governments, since most of the civil servants were men
who had little knowledge or consideration, the situation hardly improved. Young
male staff, for example, publicly handed out in the centres one napkin at a
time, not knowing that half a dozen or so are needed each day during the
menstrual period, telling recipients that they could ask for more if needed.
The evacuation centres, mostly set up in school gymnasiums, had no
partitions and male evacuees slept right beside young women. The newspapers
reported the need for privacy. The work of providing meals at the centres by
volunteers and cleaning up the centres was mostly left to the women who were
victims themselves. They took care of family members, plans for rebuilding
homes, in addition to cooking for dozens of people, and for months on end.
It is easy to pretend that the victims had a strong sense of unity (kizuna), but once they were able to
settle in temporary housing, some women who had lived apart from their husbands
to escape from domestic violence were forced by the authorities to live
together, and thus suffered further by having to live with husbands who became
even more violent from stress due to the disaster.
Keiko Ikeda, a sociologist at Shizuoka University and an authority on
gender and disaster studies in Bangladesh, has highlighted four issues in
disaster areas around the world, be they developing or developed countries.[1] Firstly,
there is a global trend toward gender differences in human victims, with women
suffering more than men. Secondly, after a disaster, the gender based division
of labour is strengthened, increasing
women’s workload and disadvantaging their access to reconstruction resources.
Thirdly, after a disaster, human rights are less well protected, with increased
violence against women, for example. Fourthly, women serve to reduce the risks
after a disaster in many ways and are resilient.
Of the
6,402 victims following the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995, 2,713 were men
but 3,680 were women, including nine missing. In the recent Great East Japan
Earthquake, of 15,786 victims in the three northern prefectures, 7,360 were men
and 8,362 were women among the 15,727 bodies whose sex could be identified.[2] Gender
issues in developed countries should be revisited from the perspective of human
security.
[1] Institute of Social
Science, University
of Tokyo, “Gender Equality and Multi-cultural Convivality in the age of
Globalization- Disaster, Restoration and Gender equality” 6.11 Symposium, pp.10-17
West high, East low – Tohoku
region is the hinterland of Japan’s modernization
The Yomiuri Shimbun carried a shocking report on 28 September 2011, half a
year after the disaster, that 12% of physicians and 5% of nurses in Fukushima
had resigned after the nuclear power plant accident, forcing some departments
and night time emergency wards to close. Fukushima had always been short of
physicians compared to other regions. High pressure in the West and low
pressure in the East is a familiar Japanese weather pattern, but the same is
true of the number of physicians. There are serious regional discrepancies in
the number of doctors, according to Dr.Masahiro Kami from the Institute of
Medical Science, the University of Tokyo, who serves as an advisor as I do, to
Soma City, Fukushima Prefecture Reconstruction Conference.
After the Great Earthquake, both Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures suffered like
Fukushima from a serious shortage of doctors in the devastated areas. The Red
Cross Hospital in Ishinomaki, which valiantly served as a medical base, was
often singled out as providing committed and remarkable services. The shortage
of physicians was not only made worse by the disaster, but was a serious issue
because there had been few doctors in the areas where the disaster struck.
Following the standards of the Japan Meteorological Agency, East Japan
includes Kanto and Koshin (Tokyo, Saitama, Nagano), Hokuriku (Niigata and
Toyama) and Tokai (Fukui, Gifu and Mie) and West Japan includes all areas to
the west of Kyoto, Shiga, Nara and Wakayama, in other words, Kinki, Chugoku,
Shikoku and northern and southern Kyushu.
Comparing the number of physicians per 100,000 people, the national average
is 217.5, but the number is 197.5 in East Japan and 248.5 in West Japan.
Although simple comparisons cannot be applied to social infrastructure such as
the number of tunnels and railroads, there are clear differences. The number of
higher educational institutions such as universities is also limited. The
modernization of Japan, which began in the Meiji Era, was heavily biased in
favour of the west, where the most of political leaders of Meiji Era came from and
the Tohoku region was clearly left out of that process and is now suffering in
support and reconstruction activities as a result. Not only in developing
countries do the regions inhabited by powerful military and political groups
enjoy priority in development.
Forcing sacrifices on a
limited number of people
The 3/11 disaster clearly revealed the problems of the social structure and
their relations to the myriad problems encountered by Japan since modernization
began in the Meiji Era. While the country as a whole enjoyed great prosperity,
it has chronically forced sacrifices on minorities and limited numbers of
people for the sake of the majority. Examples include the US military bases in
Okinawa, mineral poisoning by Ashio Copper Mines in the late Meiji Era
foreshadowing industrial pollution, Minamata disease (mercury poisoning) and
the present issues of nuclear power plants. There are 54 nuclear reactors in
Japan, putting the country third after 104 units of the USA and 59 units of
France. Russia comes fourth with 31 units and Korea fifth with 20.
The nuclear power plants in Japan are located in 21 municipalities in 13
prefectures.[1] They were constructed when
the state’s predictions for power demand during the era of high economic growth
met the wishes of municipalities not to miss out on opportunities that economic
development might bring. It is generally considered that the municipalities
that agreed to host a nuclear power plant enjoyed economic benefits via subsidies
granted under the three acts promoting the power resources development tax[2], but the reality is not that
simple. The hosting of nuclear power plants is inextricably linked with
regional discrepancies.
Shuji Shimizu, Vice President of Fukushima University, who has studied the
relationship between the three acts on promoting the power resources
development tax and municipalities with nuclear power plants, points out that
while the municipalities accepted plants in the hope that industries and
urbanization would follow, the economic benefits were limited to the
construction industry and even then, only temporarily.[3] Since
electric power can be transmitted over long distances, there are no real
advantages for businesses to build factories near nuclear power plants, while
most work related to nuclear power plants is too specialized for local SMEs to
handle. On the other hand, since nuclear power plant workers receive higher
wages than local businesses can offer, much of the work force is absorbed by
the nuclear power plant, making the local industrial structure entirely
dependent on the nuclear power plant and therefore unbalanced. Subsidies were
originally used only for the construction of buildings and infrastructure.
Municipalities enriched by government subsidies and revenues from the fixed
property tax continue to invest in building roads and public facilities while
the subsidies and fixed property tax gradually diminish. On the other hand, the
cost of maintaining public facilities increases, and so municipalities can only
maintain a fiscal balance with capital investment from the construction of
other nuclear power plants. Shimizu considers that subsidies are merely payment
for the inconvenience of building plants in depopulated areas which cannot be built
in cities. The Guidelines for Reactor Site Evaluation established by the
state’s Atomic Energy Commission obligates nuclear reactors to be built in
sparsely populated areas in case of accidents. This directly contradicts
municipalities’ wish for urbanization and population increase following the
construction of a plant. Once again, the existence of nuclear power plants is
premised on regional discrepancies.
Another premise is that nuclear power plant operation involves exposure to
radiation: work was subcontracted out knowing that workers would be exposed to
radiation, workers who could be called “nuclear power plant hibakusha”
or victims of nuclear radiation. Even nine months after the 3/11 disaster,
there are still 3,000 people working at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Plant trying to bring the situation under control. They are battling against
the odds under incomparably high doses of radiation, but exposure to high
radiation is not only a post-accident phenomenon; rather, workers at all
nuclear power plants are constantly exposed to high radiation levels even
during routine inspection or cleaning.
Even before the disaster, some people warned of the situation through the
media and their own writings, but both the media and researchers of human security,
including myself, as well as activists against the violation of human rights,
were either disinterested or ignorant of the problem. As a result, most
consumers have taken electricity for granted and never really considered how it
is generated with enormous sacrifice.
The
harsh working conditions of dispatched temporary personnel were already serious
before 3/11. Workers at nuclear power plants endured similar conditions to day
workers and dispatched temporary workers subcontracted to undertake dangerous
work for low wages.
[2]
Subsidies that are issued to prefectural and municipal governments where
nuclear power plants are located as well as to neighbouring municipalities
under the three acts promoting the power resources development tax which is
collected from electric power companies. These three acts were established on 3
June 1974: the Electric Power Development Taxation Act which outlines the
system, the Act on Areas Adjacent to Electric Power Generating Facilities which
establishes the subsidies, and the Special Budget Act for the Development of
Electric Power, a special account system established for the disbursement of
subsidies.
[3] Shuji Shimizu, Sabetsu tositeno Genshi Ryoku, Liberta shuppan, 2011, Genpatsu ninao Chiiki no Mirai wo Takuseruka, Jichitai Kenkyuusya,
2011
4. Role of NGOs in complementing the public domain and challenges for
Japanese civil society
One of the distinctive features of human security, unlike the conventional
concept of national security, is that those involved in wide-ranging issues are
not limited to the state; the public played a major role in providing
assistance after the Great East Japan Earthquake, once again highlighting the
strengths and weaknesses of a developed country.
In the 3/11 disaster, Japanese
NGOs played important roles. Japan has
long been one of the world’s top donors for
international assistance, but since the US Occupation of Japan ended, has
rarely experienced receiving aid itself. Therefore, the government was not
accustomed to being a recipient and was not in a position to utilize the
UN system for disaster relief, which Japan has been supporting for a
long time. Also, the
expertise and knowledge in overseas disaster relief
built up over the years by the
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
as well as the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), which is in charge of
official development assistance (ODA), were hardly used at all following
3/11, since the Cabinet
Office was in charge of the relief activities. The MOFA was limited to acting
as a liaison for the influx of international
foreign aid. As a result, a huge gap
arose between the international standard
and Japanese disaster relief, and it was the NGOs that
filled the gap by
trying to apply such international guidelines
and approaches as the Sphere standard, a
right-based approach, gender
and disaster, and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Japan Platform (JPF)
also worked closely with UN agencies such as
UNHCR and WFP. Thus, Japanese NGOs played broader roles than as
simple service providers.
However, due to several challenges facing
the Japanese NGO community, this latent strength has not been fully utilized
yet. First, JPF staff as well as other
Japanese NGOs working for the 3/11 disaster are primarily
internationally focused organizations; their mission,
structures, and staffing are not geared for responding
to domestic emergencies. Furthermore, just like the
functions of UN agencies in Japan, many of the
Japanese affiliates of international NGOs were
established for fund-raising purposes. Therefore, those world-leading international
NGOs did not play the same role as they have
done after other natural disasters
elsewhere.
Secondly, since NGOs are not well accepted or
recognized as major relief providers by
the Cabinet Office, municipal and
local governments as well as
beneficiaries, they have often been treated as “volunteers” rather
than as professional relief organizations. Thus,
precious time was lost in such NGOs introducing themselves
and arranging the initial coordination.
The third challenge is the nuclear issue. There
are far fewer NGOs working in Fukushima than
in Miyagi and Iwate prefectures. In
the initial stage of the emergency, the
few NGOs[1]
working in Fukushima prefecture concentrated
on delivering
emergency kits
including food and non-food
items,
but struggled
to set up subsequent
programs for the second
stage. This was completely
new and unknown operation for Japanese NGOs;
the experience and
lessons learned in Fukushima should be shared with the
broader international aid community.
[1] According to the Japan NGO Center for
International Cooperation (JANIC), there are 17 NGOs working in Fukushima
Prefecture, 40 in Miyagi and 33 in Iwate. The contrast is even clearer in the
number of projects organized by NGOs between March and June 2011: 292 projects
in Miyagi, 179 in Iwate and 60 in Fukushima. The organizations working in
Fukushima include: Association for Aid and Relief, Japan, ADRA Japan, ICA,
Peace Builders and SHAPLA NEER.
5. Introducing the concept of human security for
developed countries
The 3/11 disaster showed that the concept of human
security is effective not only for developing countries but also for developed
countries. From the beginning, human security has been
considered a common concept appropriate for all states. However, it was assumed
that human security is sufficiently ensured in developed democratic states, and
so work focused on developing countries and their people. In the
disaster-affected areas of East Japan, not only after the disaster but also
during the reconstruction, vulnerable persons including the elderly and persons
with disabilities did not receive sufficient assistance, and considerations for
women and gender were insufficient. The disaster provides an opportunity to
consider the potential of the human security concept.
5.1 Concept of human security as a preventive
measures - The situation of nuclear power plant workers
The inclusion of
“prevention” in the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P) ” framework was widely
applauded[1]. However, prevention will
not be a patent for R2P. Rather, the author argues that prevention is
key to human security concept, too.
It has been argued that
the labour unions were one of the many causes of the Fukushima nuclear
accident.[2] It is said that the cosy
relationship between labour and management led to inadequate checking.
Before 3/11, protecting dispatched
or temporary contract workers was a serious social issue in
Japan. Not only small companies, but also leading global
companies have been blamed for using temporary dispatched workers to
increase the freedom to hire and dismiss workers depending upon firms’ economic
conditions.
However, it is now
clear that this issue is related to the risk
management of nuclear power plants. If all the workers at the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant had been full-time employees
of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), whose fair treatment and welfare
were the responsibility of the labour union of TEPCO, and the relationship
between labour and management had been proper, the risk management and
security control of the plant would have been different in terms of labour safety. However, in
reality, the labour union of TEPCO avoided dangerous work and
asked management to
subcontract it out.[3] The dreadful working
conditions at Fukushima Daiichi have
been repeatedly reported in both major newspapers and weekly magazines,
and it is now clear that even in normal times
such as periodic,
routine inspections of the plant, workers
were exposed to dangerous radiation, and much
of the work was conducted by subcontracted workers.[4] Nuclear reactors cannot be
run without subjecting
the workforce to a certain level of radiation and health risk.
Protecting the human security of
such workers might result in safer standards
and better prevention.
5.2 Reviewing human security
The 3/11 disaster is an opportunity to review human
security. Needless to say, the concept of human security has met various
criticisms: that it was introduced by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) in 1994 under different circumstances, how it might relate to the
national circumstances and interests of Canada and Japan, that its scope is too
broad, and that it lacks practicality as an analytical concept. The list goes
on: it suffers from conceptual ambiguity and immaturity, lacks clarity, hides
new colonial and imperialistic ideologies, lacks discussion on subject and
object, places the general public as objects of unilateral protection while
defining national security and human security as mutually complementary, and lacks a study of cases of confrontation and
conflict between the two. [5]
Conscious of these criticisms and the present
situation, I have attempted to show here that application of the human security
concept in times of both war and peace, regardless of whether in
a developed or developing country, contributes to protecting the security of
the people.
Human security should be understood as a practical
guideline, not as an analytical concept or framework. The reason is clear: the
concept finds strength in the context of providing support and relief in the
situation today. The Commission on Human
Security discusses the need to strike a balance among humanitarian, political,
military, human rights and development strategies, and the human security
paradigm provides such a framework, emphasizing the protection and empowerment
of people, a concern shared by all the different strategies. [6] Human security today should integrate and
comprehensively enable the protection of people as originally intended. As mandates and issues are
divided due to the pursuit of professionalism, aid agencies tend to fail to see a person as a whole when
providing international cooperation. The essence of human security is most
graphically expressed in the multi-sector multi-agency approach requested by
the United Nations’ Trust Fund for Human Security.
Furthermore,
I would like to propose human security as a concept that not only visualizes social conflicts and the victims, but also supersedes those
conflicts as
experienced in Japan during the 3/11 disaster.
The disaster
brought home the reality that many Japanese are robbed of human security and
have become too disinterested in maintaining their own security while enjoying
the fruits of their sacrifice. Without ensuring human security, peace will not be achieved in times of peace.
I would
also suggest that it is the concept of human security that prompts dialogue
rather than a zero-sum battle when human security and national security
conflict with each other, or when policies and actions are taken to protect one
group while endangering the lives of another.
Peace studies show that the essence of human security
is represented in our efforts to recognize and expose such contradictions, and
to introduce ways to overcome them including by developing concepts that
encourage reviewing others differently, and by attempting not to create
outcasts in society by putting the spotlight on structural violence during
times of peace.
We must review and apply human security when reviewing
the structural violence hidden in peacetime.
Conclusion: Human
security transcends time and national borders
Finally, what is meant by the word “human”, the
subject of human security?
The word “human” in human security means
all people on earth. From the perspective of giving aid, it means paying special
attention to socially vulnerable persons, such as the elderly, those with
disabilities and women to whom aid is slow to reach. Human security in
developed countries is a concept that demands policymakers to consider
minorities who are marginalized and suffer from issues such as the existence of
nuclear power plants and military bases. It also means that human security is a
concept that encourages citizens, who are voters as well as consumers, to
recognize such issues.
Furthermore, the targets of human security are not
limited to those of us living in the present, but include the
protection of security beyond time and space to persons of the future and the
past. As we confront the stark reality that highly radioactive waste and
nuclear debris will continue to threaten humanity for at least 100,000 years,
the nuclear power plant issue should not be limited to that of energy policies, but that of future human
security. If we extend the time axis to the past, it means finding out the
truth about the violation of human rights and humanitarian law, highlighting
victims of war crimes and punishing those responsible for such deeds. This
focus on human security should encompass the victims who have already died.
This paper discussed some aspects of human
security in a developed country, focusing on the triple
disaster in Japan. The author argued that the
concept of human security should be used as a
preventive measure to prevent further nuclear crises, and
discussed the challenges of facing
society in Japan.
The lessons learned in Japan are
not unique; if an unprecedented
natural or
manmade disaster were to strike,
other donors, and
developed countries might experience the same nightmare as Japan did. Timely,
objective and serious evaluations
and studies on the operations of the
government, academia, practitioners as well as Japanese NGO community after
3/11 are required. The
application of human security concept in
this process will be an
important challenge
[1]
Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to
Protect, Polity Press, 2009, p. 98.
[2]
Takeo Kinoshita, “Tôden no Bôsô to Kigyôshugi teki Tôgô” (TEPCO on a Rampage
and Enterprises Sticking Together), POSSE
Vol. 11, <3.11> ga Yurugashita Rôdô (Labour force shaken by 3.11), Gôdô Shuppan, 2011.
[3]
Kunio Horie, Gempatsu Gypsie, zôho
kaitei-ban – Hibaku Shita Uke Rôdôsha no Kiroku (Nuclear power gypsies new
expanded edition – Record of contract labour victims), Gendai Shokan, 2011.
[4] Kenji
Higuchi, Yami ni Kesareru Gempatsu
Hibakusha (Nuclear power victims cast into darkness), Hachigatsu-shokan,
2011.
[5] Ryo
Oshiba, “International Organization and Human Security” in
Akio Takayanagi and Rony Alexander eds. Watashi
Tachi no Heiwa Wo Tsukuru, Horitsu Bunka Sha, 2004, pp.290-294;Makoto
Katsumata eds., Globlization and Human
Security, Nihon Kezaizai Hyoron sha, 2001
